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Bayesian probability holds the potential to serve as an important bridge between qualitative and 
quantitative methodology.  Yet whereas Bayesian statistical techniques have been successfully 
elaborated for quantitative research, applying Bayesian probability to qualitative research remains 
an open frontier.  This paper advances the burgeoning literature on Bayesian process tracing by 
drawing on expositions of Bayesian “probability as extended logic” from the physical sciences, 
where probabilities represent rational degrees of belief in propositions given the inevitably limited 
information we possess.  We provide step-by-step guidelines for explicit Bayesian process tracing, 
calling attention to technical points that have been overlooked or inadequately addressed, and we 
illustrate how to apply this approach with the first systematic application to a case study that draws 
on multiple pieces of detailed evidence.  While we caution that efforts to explicitly apply Bayesian 
learning in qualitative social science will inevitably run up against the difficulty that probabilities 
cannot be unambiguously specified, we nevertheless envision important roles for explicit Bayesian 
analysis in pinpointing the locus of contention when scholars disagree on inferences, and in training 
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1. Introduction 
A growing movement within political science has identified Bayesianism as the 
methodological foundation of process tracing, which entails making causal inferences about a 
single case by assessing alternative explanations in light of evidence uncovered.1  Compared to 
frequentism, Bayesianism offers several advantages that are especially important for qualitative 
case research.  Bayesian probability can handle data that are not generated from a stochastic 
process (e.g., information from expert informants and archival sources), it can be applied to 
explain unique events without reference to a population, and it mandates an iterative “dialogue 
with the data,”2 which mirrors how process tracing is usually conducted. 
As part of an initiative to improve analytical transparency and establish process tracing as a 
rigorous method, the literature has moved from informal analogies to Bayesianism (McKeown 
1999, Bennett 2008, Beach and Pedersen 2013) toward efforts to explicitly apply Bayesian 
analysis in qualitative research (Rohlfing 2013, Bennett 2015, Humphreys and Jacobs 2015).  
We view this turn to Bayesianism as a watershed that provides solid grounding for in-depth, 
small-N case research.  However, whereas Bayesian statistical techniques have been successfully 
elaborated for large-N quantitative research (eg. Gill 2008, Jackman 2009, Gelman et al. 2013), 
applying Bayesian probability in qualitative case research remains a frontier that has not been 
definitively addressed.  To date, scholars have examined only a few illustrative pieces of 
evidence (Rohlfing 2013, Bennett 2015) and/or include only highly simplified process-tracing 
clues (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015).  Moreover, a number of technical points have been  
overlooked or inadequately addressed within the literature that is innovating in this terrain.  
We aim to advance efforts to apply Bayesian reasoning in process tracing by drawing on 
expositions of Bayesian “probability as extended logic” that originated in the natural sciences, 
dating back to Bernouille (1655-1705) and Laplace (1749-1827).  Modern physicists (Cox 1961, 
Jaynes 2003) have demonstrated mathematically that Bayesian probability theory provides the 
uniquely consistent extension of deductive logic, where we know whether any given proposition 
is true or false, to situations where information is incomplete, uncertainty reigns, and hypotheses 
can rarely be definitively proven or disproven.  This “logical” Bayesian notion of probability—
the rational degree of belief that we should hold in a hypothesis or some other proposition in 
light of the information we possess—in principle provides a unified framework for inference.    
We being by situating this paper’s contributions within the burgeoning literature on 
Bayesian process tracing (Section 2).  Section 3 provides a step-by-step exposition of how to 
explicitly apply Bayes’ rule to draw inferences in process tracing research.  We emphasize 
several conceptual and technical points that diverge from previous treatments, including 
comparing a hypothesis H against clearly delineated rivals, rather than its unspecified logical 
negation ~H, and using a logarithmic scale instead of a linear scale to assign probabilities, with 
an analogy to sound, which minimizes arbitrariness and facilitates meaningful assessments of 
uncertainty.  Section 4 provides illustrations from our systematic application of explicit Bayesian 
analysis to a published case study that draws on multiple pieces of evidence; Appendix A 
elaborates this case application in detail.      
Section 5 concludes by assessing the potential for explicit Bayesian analysis to improve 
causal inference and analytic transparency in qualitative research, an important and timely issue 
given ongoing debate within political science on how best to promote research transparency !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1Bayesianism also underpins casual analysis in qualitative research much more broadly, including assessing higher-
level theories in light of multiple cases.   
2 Astrophysicist Stephen Gull, quoted in Sivia (2006).   
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(www.dartstatement.org, Lupia and Elman 2014, QMMR 2015, www.qualtd.net). We envision 
important roles for explicit Bayesian analysis in communicating judgments and pinpointing the 
locus of contention when scholars disagree on inferences, as well as training intuition to make 
more systematic and logically rigorous conclusions.  However, we caution that assigning 
numerical values to probabilities in qualitative research involves a substantial dose of 
arbitrariness that can limit the utility of explicitly employing Bayesian analysis when assessing 
complex evidence and nuanced causal models.  These caveats do not undermine the importance 
of Bayesian probability as the aspirational ideal of scientific inference and the methodological 
foundation for process tracing. Understanding the technical details of Bayesian probability that 
we elaborate can help discipline our reasoning and elucidate best practices for process tracing, 
whether formal or narrative-based.   
Beyond providing rigorous analytical tools and insights for process-tracing practitioners, 
this paper aims to foster greater understanding of the inferential logic that underlies qualitative 
case research among a broader political science audience.  All research, from large-N 
econometrics to historical analysis, draws on insights from qualitative information, and we 
believe that Bayesian probability can serve as an important bridge between qualitative and 
quantitative methodology.   
 
2. Mapping the Intellectual Terrain   
Treatments of Bayesianism in political science draw their foundations on what we call the 
“psychological” school, which underlies most Bayesian epistemology in philosophy of science 
and Bayesian statistics textbooks (e.g., Savage 1954, Howson and Urbach 2006).  In contrast, we 
advocate “logical” Bayesianism, as articulated in the physical sciences, as the methodological 
foundation for process tracing and scientific inference more broadly. Whereas psychological 
Bayesianism treats probabilities as a matter of informed opinion, logical Bayesianism seeks to 
represent the rational degree of belief that we should hold in propositions given the information 
we possess, independently of whims, hopes, or personal predilections.  A probability P(A|B) 
represents the degree of belief that is rational to hold in proposition A if nothing but B is 
presumed known.   
A central tenet of logical Bayesianism is that probabilities should encode knowledge in a 
unique, “consistent” manner.  Incorporating information in different but logically equivalent 
ways (e.g. learning the same pieces of information in a different order) must produce identical 
probabilities, and rational individuals who possess the same information must assign the same 
probabilities.  Cox (1961) and Jaynes (2003) demonstrated that if we demand consistency and 
measure degrees of belief with real numbers between zero and one, then we must adopt the 
standard sum and product rules for manipulating and updating probabilities as the unique mode 
of reasoning in the face of uncertainty.  Bayes’ theorem and all other mathematical operations in 
Bayesian analysis follow directly from these basic rules.   
Logical Bayesianism is prescriptive, in that it aspires to elaborate procedures that a rational 
individual should follow when reasoning with limited information.  In practice, simplifications 
and approximations are usually required.  Even in the natural sciences, the full calculations may 
be too difficult to complete or even set up, and prior knowledge cannot always be translated 
unambiguously into prior probabilities.  In social science and especially in qualitative research, 
we must accept some degree of subjectivity as inevitable.  But we can nevertheless train our 
thinking to better approximate logical Bayesianism; this paper aims to further that goal.   
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Moving from methodological foundations to practice, pioneering research on process 
tracing has not yet resolved the question of how to operationalize Bayesian reasoning for in-
depth case analysis that evaluates complex hypotheses and large amounts of nuanced qualitative 
information. We build on Bennett (2015) by providing a technical exposition grounded in logical 
Bayesianism. We expound key principles including conditioning likelihoods on previously-
incorporated evidence that are noted but not fully explicated or applied in previous treatments, 
and we stress the necessity of comparing well-specified rival hypotheses. Abell (2009) shares 
some similarities with our approach but focuses on inferring the existence of single casual 
“links” in a narrative and does not recognize the importance of assessing well-posed alternative 
explanations rather than asking whether a given causal mechanism is present or absent.    
Turning to the multi-methods literature, Humphreys and Jacobs (2015) break new ground 
with their Bayesian model (BIQQ) for combining correlational data with simple process-tracing 
clues.  Their work points to the importance of Bayesian probability as a unified framework of 
inference.  However, if our goal is applying Bayesian analysis to evidence-intensive process 
tracing, the BIQQ model is more complicated than needed.  Drawing on medical testing 
analogies, Humphreys and Jacobs classify cases into types (adverse, beneficial, chronic, 
destined) according to the potential outcome a treatment would elicit.  Because these types are 
unobservable and carry no information about causal mechanisms, we regard them as nuisance 
parameters. This setup becomes cumbersome if we are searching for the best explanation for a 
given case, rather than assessing average causal effects and other population-level parameters 
from a sample. Instead of conditioning on the case’s hidden type, we advocate directly 
evaluating the likelihood of the evidence conditional on each hypothesis we wish to compare.  
A common feature of both the Bayesian process-tracing literature and the Bayesian multi-
methods literature is the central role they retain for Van Evera’s (1997) process-tracing tests 
(Bennett 2008 & 2015, Collier 2011, Mahoney 2012, Humphreys and Jacobs 2015). We view 
classification of tests as unnecessary within a Bayesian framework, since evidentiary 
confirmation is always a matter of degree, not type, and inference is always governed by the 
logic of Bayes’ rule. In addition, although much of Van Evera’s reasoning is intuitively 
Bayesian, the notion of process tracing tests remains close in spirit to frequentist statistical 
theory, with its tradition of subjecting hypotheses to a sequence of discrete, named tests that can 
be either passed or failed. Instead, we again advocate directly evaluating likelihoods under 
alternative hypotheses, as explained in the following section. 
 
3. Operationalizing Bayesian Analysis 
Explicit Bayesian process tracing involves three key steps: (§3.1) specifying hypotheses Hi 
and assigning their prior probabilities, P(Hi | I ), given relevant background information I, (§3.2) 
identifying the evidence, E, and (§3.3) assessing likelihoods, P(E |Hi I ), and/or likelihood ratios, 
P(E |Hi I ) ⁄ P(E |Hj I ).  We can then obtain the posterior odds on Hi  vs. Hj in light of the evidence 
by applying the relative odds-ratio form of Bayes’ rule:  
 ! !! !!!! !! !!! = ! !! !!)! !!|!! × !! ! !! !!! ! !! !! !!,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(1)!
 
In §3.4, we explicate the rationale for using a logarithmic scale when assigning numerical values 
to probabilities; §3.5 illustrates how to derive an aggregate inference from multiple pieces of 
evidence.  Looking forward, we stress that evaluating what Bayesian analysis can do for process 
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tracing as well as the challenges and limitations requires an understanding of the technical 
aspects discussed below.     
 
3.1 Hypotheses and Priors       
The first step in explicit Bayesian process tracing entails specifying the set of hypotheses  
we wish to consider, {Hk}.  Whereas most treatments compare a single working hypothesis H 
against it logical negation, ~H, we advocate identifying one or more concrete rival hypotheses.  
This approach is critical in social science, because ~H generally will not be a well-defined 
proposition—H could fail to hold in an essentially infinite number of ways.  The more specific 
the hypothesis is, the more possibilities are embodied in ~H.  Directly assessing likelihoods of 
the form P(E|~H I) will be practically impossible if we have not first contemplated what concrete 
possibilities ~H might actually entail.  Suppose HA = Suspect A killed the victim, and we have a 
clue E = A’s glove was found at the crime scene.  If the only plausible alternative hypothesis is 
HB = ~HA = Suspect B, A’s bitter ex-spouse, killed the victim and framed A, then P(E|~HA I) 
could be fairly high, assuming the ex-spouse still had some access to A’s personal effects.  
However, if the only plausible alternative hypothesis is HC = ~HA = Suspect C, a total stranger to 
A, killed the victim, then P(E|~HA I) might be quite low.  If both HB and HC are considered 
plausible alternatives, the only sensible way to proceed is to evaluate the likelihood conditional 
on each hypothesis separately, P(E|Hi I).  We can then calculate posterior odds ratios for HA vs. 
HB and HA vs. HC, or we can use Bayes’ rule to obtain the posterior probability on each of the 
three hypotheses and then calculate P(~HA|E I) = 1−P(HA|E I), keeping in mind that our 
background information includes the assumption that ~HA =HB + HC.      
Whenever possible, mutually exclusive hypotheses are preferable.  In principal, we can 
always take a set of non-rival hypotheses and construct a set of mutually exclusive rivals.  For 
example, consider two factors that could motivate presidents to violate protectionist policy 
mandates: a desire to represent voters’ best interests, and a desire to seek rents associated with 
neoliberalism (Stokes 2001).  If we think both factors may contribute, we could delineate five 
rivals: H1 = predominantly representation, H2 = both but mostly representation, H3 = both in 
relatively equal measure, H4 = both but mostly rent-seeking, H5 = predominantly rent-seeking.  
Strictly speaking, ensuring that these possibilities are mutually exclusive requires greater 
precision—what exactly do we mean by “predominantly” vs. “mostly” vs. “relatively equal”?  
This specification issue can pose challenges in explicit Bayesian process tracing.3  In practice, it 
is important to specify hypotheses as carefully as possible and to explicitly include the 
assumption that they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive as part of the background 
information.  If new evidence suggests that a more complex hypothesis would provide the best 
explanation, we should incorporate it in {Hk} and redo the analysis. 
Once we have specified rival hypotheses, we must assign prior probabilities. In principle, 
we advocate starting from an initial state of maximal ignorance, I0, and placing equal prior 
probabilities on each hypothesis,4 in accord with the “principle of indifference” or Laplace’s 
principle of “insufficient reason,” (Gregory 2005:37-38; Jaynes 2003:40-41). We then build up 
via Bayes’ rule from I0 to the actual prior state of knowledge I.  In practice, especially for social 
science, systematically incorporating all of our background information is infeasible. There is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Additional complications arise if we wish to model how the two factors contribute in H2–4.  They could act 
independently, or they could interact—representation might serve as a means to the end of long-term rent-seeking 
through continuity in office, if neoliberalism affords sustained opportunities for corruption.   
4 Assuming a discrete set of mutually-exclusive hypotheses. 
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simply too much such information to exhaustively list, setting aside the challenges of formally 
applying Bayes’ rule to each such piece of information. Given this reality, there are several 
reasonable options for proceeding. First, we can specify priors that aim to reflect our background 
information as best as possible, recognizing that the logical Bayesian approach is aspirational 
and some subjectivity will inevitably enter in practice. Second, we can simply use equal priors, 
which avoids biasing the initial assessment in favor of any of the hypotheses. Third, we can 
report likelihood ratios instead of posterior probabilities and allow readers to supply their own 
priors. If the evidence is strong, scholars may converge on a single hypothesis even if they start 
from different priors. If the evidence does not strongly favor a single hypothesis, scholars may at 
least be able to agree on the direction in which their beliefs should be shifted. Another option 
entails carrying out the analysis starting from several different prior probability distributions, 
which allows us to assess how sensitive our conclusions are to these initial choices.  
Leading literature on Bayesian process tracing does not always follow these guidelines.  
Consider Bennett’s (2015) discussion of Tannenwald’s (2007) research on the non-use of nuclear 
weapons in the postwar period. He focuses on Tannenwald’s three principle alternative 
hypotheses, which we denote HD = deterrence, HM = lack of military utility, and HT = norms, in 
the form of a “nuclear taboo.”  Bennett (2015:277) observes that these hypotheses “at first glance 
seem equally plausible.”  In accord with this assessment, which corresponds to the indifference 
principle, we should use equal prior probabilities of 1/3 for each hypothesis.  However, Bennett 
(2015:278) instead chooses a prior of 40% for HT and 60% for ~HT (=HD+HM).  Rohlfling 
(2013:13-16) in contrast constructs priors through a process that entails identifying one working 
hypothesis, assigning a preliminary prior probability of 50%, discovering a rival hypotheses by 
exploring the literature, and then reducing the prior probability on the working hypothesis by 
what appears to be an arbitrary amount.  After two iterations corresponding to the discovery of 
two alternative hypotheses, he ultimately gives the working hypothesis a prior of 30%.  Instead, 
best practice mandates that we should state each hypothesis from the outset, before assigning 
priors.  When comparing three mutually exclusive hypotheses, we could then assign equal prior 
probabilities of 1/3, or we could choose values that aim to reflect our background information, 
with an explanation of why we favor some hypotheses over others. 
Reiterating the critical points, before assigning priors, we must elaborate a clearly 
articulated set of hypotheses that we assume to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  We 
should then assign a probability to each hypothesis, rather than considering only the working 
hypothesis and its logical negation, which implicitly contains all of the rivals.  If we discover or 
devise a new hypothesis later on, we must start the problem over and reassign priors.   
 
3.2  Evidence   
We take a broad, common-sense view of what constitutes evidence in process tracing—any 
relevant observation or information (beyond our background knowledge) that bears on the truth 
of our hypotheses.  Evidence often contains information about timing and sequencing, actors’ 
goals and intentions, and other aspects of causal mechanisms, as obtained from a wide range of 
sources including interviews, archives, media records, and secondary literature.  Bayesianism 
does not face any of the restrictions that limit frequentist statistics to analyzing only replicable 
observations or data generated from some stochastic process, such as random sampling.  The 
type of evidence—regardless of how distinctions are delimited—does not matter for the 
fundamental logic of Bayesian analysis, because we are allowed to evaluate the probability of 
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any proposition.5  For example, the evidence we evaluate in our empirical example includes not 
only “within-case” observations about the causal process driving Chile’s 2005 tax reform, but 
also “cross-case” evidence from previous tax reform episodes that bears on the hypotheses for 
explaining the 2005 reform (see E1, Section 4).  We view classification of evidence as 
superfluous unless it helps us evaluate likelihoods, because the evidence enters Bayesian 
calculations only through likelihoods, regardless of its origin or form.  
In a Bayesian framework, attempting to provide a definition of what constitutes “good” 
evidence is largely beside the point.6  Evidence can be more or less informative, as determined 
by the likelihood ratio, but probative value—or “weight of evidence”7—falls on a continuum.  
Moreover, what matters is how strongly the total body of evidence discriminates between rival 
hypotheses.  For example, multiple pieces of information that each yield a very small weight of 
evidence together with one piece of information that produces a large weight of evidence may 
give an overall inference of essentially the same strength as a single highly probative piece of 
information, or two pieces of information with intermediate weights of evidence.  While we 
would ideally like every piece of evidence we gather to be highly probative, in social science we 
must often make inferences based on the accumulated weight of evidence from many clues, none 
of which is strongly decisive.  On the other hand, we sometimes do encounter a highly decisive 
piece of evidence, in which case we need not spend time systematically assessing other 
marginally probative pieces of evidence, because the latter will not affect the overall inference. 
Likewise, there is no general prescription for designating what constitutes a distinct “piece” 
of evidence.  We are free to disaggregate the overall body of evidence E into components E1–EN 
as finely or as coarsely as we see fit, with the goal of parsing information at a level that 
facilitates reasoning about likelihoods (Section 3.3).  As a broad rule of thumb, observations that 
intuitively appear to favor different hypotheses, or information derived from distinct types of 
sources (e.g. a right-wing politician vs. a labor-union leader) are usually best treated as separate 
pieces of evidence, whereas similar information arising from similar sources (e.g. two 
government informants tell a similar story about a policy process) might usefully be treated as a 
single piece of evidence.  A second rule of thumb would be to avoid disaggregating the evidence 
too finely; if we seek to make too many analytical steps explicit, we risk becoming lost in 
minutia.  On the other hand, if we aggregate too much evidence, it becomes difficult to assess the 
overall likelihood of what is actually a conjunction of many distinct propositions.   
 
3.3 Likelihoods and Likelihood Ratios    
Assessing likelihoods and likelihood ratios is the key inferential step in Bayesian process 
tracing. The likelihood of the evidence tells us how we should update our prior degree of belief 
in a given hypothesis, and, more importantly, likelihood ratios allow us to adjudicate between 
rival hypotheses and thereby identify the best explanation in light of the evidence. This section 
explains how best to interpret and assess likelihoods, with guidelines for handling information 
from sources that may not be reliable and accounting for logical dependence among multiple 




5 The difficulty of assigning probabilities may nevertheless vary. 
6 Aside from issues of data validation (e.g. correctly recording sources, avoiding mistranslation).  
7 §3.4 gives a precise mathematical definition for the weight of evidence. 
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3.3.1  Inhabit the World of Each Hypothesis 
The likelihood P(E|Hi I) is our degree of belief in the truth of E—a proposition which 
states some specific empirical evidence—conditional on a given hypothesis and our background 
information.  Colloquially, we sometimes speak of the probability of ‘finding or observing the 
evidence,’ since we are typically interested in updating beliefs in light of evidence that we have 
actually obtained.  When using this language, we implicitly assume that proposition E includes  
the fact that the researcher learned or reliably observed the relevant information.8       
The key to assessing P(E|Hi I) is to remember that we are assuming Hi is correct.  Recall 
that in the standard notation of conditional probability, everything to the right of the vertical bar 
is “conditioning information” that is either reliably known or assumed as a conjecture when 
reasoning about the probability of the proposition to the left of the bar.  While we do not actually 
know whether Hi is true, we must nevertheless consider the implications of Hi being true.  In 
Hunter’s (1984) illuminating terminology, we must “mentally inhabit the world of the 
hypothesis” and ask how surprising (low probability) or expected (high probability) the evidence 
would be in that world, or in other words, how likely would it be for E to hold true in that world.  
If the evidence is more probable in the ‘H1 world’ relative to the ‘H2 world,’ then that evidence 
will increase the odds we place on H1 vs. H2.9  That is, we gain confidence in one hypothesis to 
the extent that it makes the evidence we see more plausible in comparison to the rival hypothesis.     
Assessing likelihoods entails thinking about how consistent the evidence is with the world 
of the hypothesis in question and imagining what other kinds of observations or scenarios we 
might expect in that world.  However, we cannot hope to enumerate a full list of possible clues 
that could have occurred; as Leibniz remarked, “evidence is not be counted but weighed.”  
Section 4 provides examples that illustrate the reasoning process behind assessing likelihoods.     
 
3.3.2  Testimonial Evidence: Assess the likelihood that “source S stated X”    
In the natural sciences, a measurement apparatus usually needs to be calibrated before 
gathering and/or analyzing the data.  In the social sciences, we often use “testimonial evidence” 
(La Place) provided by people (e.g. politicians, journalists, historians) who may misremember, 
dissemble, or skew facts to suit their interests.  The closet analog of calibration might entail 
assessing the reliability of the source; yet in general we cannot do so in any absolute sense, 
independently of what exactly was said and which hypothesis holds among the set of alternatives 
under consideration.  Suppose we are studying a pension reform legislated in a developing 
country, and a close advisor to the president tells us: “Congress was willing to sit down and 
negotiate after the president explained to the public that ‘there will be no money for people to 
retire in five years if we don’t do the reform now.’”  We might consider two rival hypotheses: 
H1= the legislation passed because the president made compelling public appeals that put 
pressure on congress to approve the reform, and H2 = the reform passed because the president’s 
chief of staff bribed members of congress.  In the world of H1, what the informant has said is true 
and accurate, whereas in the world of H2, the informant has provided incorrect information.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In other words, if E = ‘The scholar observed E0 ’ then asking ‘what is the probability that E is true given H’ is 
equivalent to asking ‘what is the probability of observing E0 if H is true.’ We sometimes elide the extra verbiage in 
E and use E0 as a shortcut. 
9 In our usage, ‘the world of H’ defines a family of possibilities where H holds, but various contingencies consistent 
with H (which might constitute evidence or clues) may or may not occur. Others might describe these as multiple 
possible worlds (Barrenechea & Mahoney 2016). 
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Testimonial evidence in process tracing is best analyzed by including the source in the 
definition of the evidence.  In other words, evidence E should typically take the form “source S 
stated X.”  For example, we might have E =An article in a left-leaning newspaper reported X.  
We can then directly evaluate the likelihood of this evidence given a specific hypothesis.  Our 
background information will include assessments of the source’s knowledgeability and 
incentives to reveal or distort the truth under a particular hypothesis, as well as a range of salient 
contextual clues (e.g. body language and intonation for interviews).  Revisiting the pension 
reform example above and taking E = A close presidential advisor told us in an interview: 
“Congress was willing to sit down and negotiate after the president explained...,” we might 
judge P(E|H1 I ) to be high, because the informant has few incentives to withhold or distort the 
truth in this world.  Under the corruption hypothesis, instrumental incentives could easily compel 
the informant to tell the (incorrect) story about the president’s public appeal, so E is not 
unexpected, but the value we assign to P(E|H2 I) will depend on our rapport and trust in the 
informant, as informed by our background information.   
These guidelines for assessing testimonial evidence follow Jaynes (2003:128), who 
emphasizes that the new information we learn in both science and politics is that a source has 
claimed some facts, not the purported facts themselves.  Contrary to this best practice, Beach and 
Pedersen (2013:126-29) regard the statement X as the evidence and attempt to assess the 
probability that X is accurate as an additional, distinct component of the analysis in a way that is 
hypothesis independent.  This approach cannot work, because in general, the accuracy of 
information X must depend on the hypothesis under consideration (see Appendix B for a 
mathematical elaboration).   
 
3.3.3. Condition on Previously-Incorporated Evidence 
When the total body of evidence E consists of multiple observations E1–EN, we can 
decompose the likelihood into a product as follows:  
 ! ! !! !! = ! !1!2…!! !! !! = ! !! !1!2…!(N!1)! ! !! !! !1!2…!(N!1)|!! !! = ⋯ = ! !! !1…!(N!1)! ! !! …! !2" !1! ! !! !! !1 ! ! !! !!,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(2) 
 
because the product rule allows us to write the joint probability of A and B as P(AB) = 
P(A|B)*P(B). The right-hand side of the equation (2) is essentially a product of likelihoods for 
each observation Ex, with the nuance that previously-analyzed evidence must be incorporated 
along with I as conditioning information. In other words, the likelihood for Ex must be assessed 
conditional not only on a hypothesis and the background information, but also on all evidence 
from the current problem that we have previously incorporated, Eprev. We must therefore ask if Ex 
is any more or less likely given that we already know Eprev, beyond whatever Hk and I  imply. 
Conditioning on previously-incorporated evidence requires careful thought about logical 
dependence between Ex and Eprev under each hypothesis.  Logical dependence is distinct from 
causal (or physical) dependence, in that Eprev need not exert any causal influence on Ex for it to 
affect our degree of belief in Ex.  Consider a textbook example of drawing without replacement 
from an urn containing two red marbles and one black marble.  Suppose we close our eyes, draw 
one marble from the urn, and set it aside without looking.  We then repeat the process and draw a 
second marble from the urn.  We are interested in the probability that the first draw produced a 
red marble, P(E1R | I ).  Before looking at either marble taken from the urn, P(E1R | I ) = 2/3.  If 
we observe the second marble drawn from the urn and discover that it is black, we gain 
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information that is highly relevant for inferences about the color of the first marble—in light of 
this information, we become certain that the first marble is red: P(E1R | E2B  I ) = 1.  The outcome 
of the second draw can in no way exert a causal influence backward in time on the outcome of 
the first draw; the dependence is entirely logical in nature.  Causal interactions between systems 
or causal influences in their common past can of course lead to logical dependence, but in a 
Bayesian framework, it is essential to remember that conditional probabilities reflect logical 
dependencies between propositions, not physical connections. 
Returning to social science, suppose an informant interviewed in December 2005 tells a 
story X, which we will denote as evidence EInf(X), and a news article from May 2005 reports a 
similar story, denoted as evidence ENews(X) .  Suppose we conduct and analyze the interview first, 
and then subsequently discover the news article, such that E1 = EInf(X) and E2 = ENews(X) .  In this 
case, E1 cannot have any causal effect on E2—what the informant has told us cannot possibly 
influence a news article written seven months earlier.  Nevertheless, P(E2 |E1 H I) will not equal 
P(E2 |H I).  Whether P(E2 |E1 H I) is higher or lower than P(E2 |H I) may depend on the 
hypothesis H.  The point is that ENews(X) and EInf(X) are logically dependent given possible causal 
connections that might have occurred in the past.  For instance, our informant may have learned 
X from reading the news article, so under many hypotheses, we would be less surprised to 
encounter the article after talking to the informant, in which case P(E2 |E1 H I) > P(E2 |H I).       
It is also important to note that dependence (or independence) is not a physical property of 
our sources—e.g. the newspaper vs. the informant in the example above—notwithstanding what 
might be suggested by common advice to seek “independent sources of evidence.”10  Instead, it 
is a logical relationship between pieces of evidence given a specific hypothesis.  For any two 
pieces of evidence—which should include information about the source—it is almost always 
possible to concoct some hypothesis under which they are dependent.  Drawing on different 
sources and distinct types of information is certainly good practice, but it does not absolve us 
from thinking carefully about potential logical dependence among the data.  The degree to which 
one source corroborates another depends on the hypothesis under consideration.    
Conditioning on previously-incorporated evidence is critical for inference—the imperative 
emerges directly from the mathematics of probability theory. However, reasoning about logical 
dependence in qualitative research can be extremely challenging. Evidence can be connected in 
arbitrarily complex ways; Ex and Ey may even be dependent in multiple ways, some of which  
might lead us to raise P(Ex |Hj Ey I) relative to P(Ex |Hj I), whereas others might lead us to lower  
P(Ex |Hj Ey I) relative to P(Ex |Hj I). Moreover, evidence may be dependent under some 
hypotheses but independent under others. In practice, we should aim to do the best we can while 
recognizing that it may not be feasible to carefully handle multiple nuanced dependencies in the 
data. 
 
3.3.4. Sequence the Evidence as Convenient 
The rules of conditional probability imply that the order of the evidence does not affect the 
final posterior probabilities.  Using the product rule of probability and commutativity, the joint 
likelihood of two pieces of evidence can be written in any of the following equivalent ways:  
P(EA EB|H I) = P(EB EA|H I) = P(EA|EB H I) P(EB|H I) = P(EB|EA H I) P(EA|H I).       (3) 
Some literature in the psychological Bayesian tradition introduces non-standard rules for 
updating probabilities, implying that the order in which evidence is analyzed does matter (e.g. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 E.g. Beach and Pedersen (2013:128), Bennett and Checkel (2015:27-28).  
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Jeffrey 1983). However, such approaches necessarily violate the fundamental rules of probability 
(equation 3) and conflict with the notion of rationality that lies at the heart of logical 
Bayesianism—information incorporated in logically equivalent ways should lead to the same 
conclusions. If in practice we do not arrive at the same posterior probabilities upon analyzing the 
evidence in a different order, we have made a mistake somewhere in our reasoning that needs to 
be corrected.  
Because we are free to consider the evidence in any order, we can look for sequences that 
facilitate conditioning on previously incorporated evidence when assessing likelihoods.  Placing 
strongly discriminating evidence last can preclude having to condition other pieces of evidence 
on the conjunction of a hypothesis and an observation that is extremely implausible under that 
hypothesis—a difficult mental exercise that requires imagining very surprising flukes or 
coincidences.  Incorporating highly-decisive evidence last can also obviate careful conditioning 
on previous evidence, because the likelihood ratios will be extremely large regardless.  On the 
other hand, if the evidence is decisive enough, we could incorporate it first and be done, since 
additional evidence will contribute only marginally to our posteriors.11   
   
3.4 Logarithmic Scales for Probabilities   
Whereas most research on Bayesian process tracing assigns values to probabilities on 
essentially linear, often course-grained scales (e.g. Rohlfing 2013:19), we advocate a logarithmic 
scale for odds and likelihood ratios, which is standard practice in the natural sciences and 
information sciences.  Using a logarithmic scale, in conjunction with an analogy to sound, better 
leverages intuition, enhances consistency when working with qualitative information, and may 
facilitate intersubjective agreement.    
This recommendation is grounded in psychophysics, which shows that sensory perception 
tends to be a logarithmic function of stimulus strength. Stated in differential terms, a just-
noticeable difference in the loudness of sound, brightness of light, or pressure on the skin is 
proportional to the magnitude of the stimulus. This relationship (the Weber-Fechner Law), which 
works well for a wide variety of stimuli and a large range of magnitudes, is sensible given that 
humans experience stimuli of highly varied intensity.  By building in a logarithmic scale, 
evolution has increased the nervous system’s dynamic range.  Given this characteristic feature of 
the nervous system, a logarithmic scale is more natural than a linear scale for measuring and 
analyzing sensory inputs. Sound, for example, is measured in decibels (dB), such that increasing 
the intensity of the sound wave by a factor of ten corresponds to an additive increment of 10 dB.   
For similar reasons, logarithmic scales were introduced to assess perceptions of uncertainty 
in probabilistic inference.  Good’s (1985) weight of evidence in favor of one hypothesis 
compared to a rival, measured in decibels, is proportional to the logarithm of the likelihood ratio: 
WOE (Hi : Hj ) = 10 log10 [ P(E|Hi  I) ⁄ P(E|Hj  I) ]              (4) 
The weight of evidence describes the probative value of the evidence—how strongly it 
discriminates between two rival hypotheses.  Good (1985) contends that a change in weight of 
evidence of one decibel, for example from even odds of 1:1 to odds of around 5:4, is as fine-
grained as we can reliably quantify our degree of belief in competing hypotheses. A change in 
probability from 75% to 90% corresponds to an increase in log-odds of about 5 dB, which is 
salient, but in the natural sciences, cogent evidence might regularly lead to swings of several tens 
of decibels.  Notice that in Bennett’s (2015:281) illustration of a smoking-gun test, where P(E|H) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Appendix A for further exposition of these considerations as applied to our case study.    
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=0.2 and P(E|~H) =0.05, the weight of evidence is only 6 dB—salient, but not decisive enough 
by Good’s standards to serve as a smoking gun for H.      
Measuring log-odds in decibels lets us leverage everyday experience with sound, while 
providing a quantitative underpinning for Gull’s metaphor of Bayesian inference as a “dialogue 
with the data”—in essence we can ask whether the evidence is whispering or shouting in favor of 
a given hypothesis.  In acoustics, the minimal noticeable change is roughly 3 dB.  A change of 5 
dB is clearly noticeable, while an increase of 10 dB is perceived as about twice as loud; 20 dB is 
roughly four times louder.  Table 1 provides typical reference sounds in decibels.      
In qualitative research, we suggest regarding decisive evidence that strongly favors one 
hypothesis over a rival as roughly 30 dB, the difference between a quiet bedroom and a 
conversation—in other words, the data are “talking clearly.”  Likewise, a very low prior log-odds 
against a hypothesis relative to a more plausible rival could reasonably be set at –50 dB (Jaynes 
2003:99-100), the difference between a pin drop and a normal conversation.    
 
Table 1: Typical Sound Levels (dB)  
Reference scales vary across sources.  See for example: www.osha.gov/dts/osta/otm/new_noise/ 
 
10 Adult hearing threshold; rustling leaves, pin-drop  
20-25 Whisper  
30 Quiet bedroom or library, ticking watch 
45 Sufficient to wake a sleeping person  
50 Moderate rainstorm   
60 Typical conversation   
70 Noisy restaurant, common TV level  
80 Busy curbside, alarm clock   
90 Passing diesel truck or motorcycle     
100 Dance club, construction cite  
115 Rock concert, baby screaming   
 
3.5 Inference via Bayes’ Rule   
The last step in explicit Bayesian process tracing entails applying Bayes’ rule to draw an 
inference.  When working with multiple pieces of evidence, we can successively apply Bayes’ 
rule (equation 1), or we can multiply likelihood ratios to conduct inference in a single step:  
 ! !! !!!! !! !!! = ! !! !!)! !!|!! × ! !! !! !!! !! !! !! !× !! !! !!! ! !!! !! !!! ! !! !×…!× ! !! !!…!!!!! ! !!! !! !!…!!!!! ! !! !!,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(5)!
 
which follows from equations (1) and (2). 
Taking the logarithm of the equation (5) gives a particularly simple, additive form of 
Bayes’ rule—the posterior log-odds equals the prior log-odds plus the weight of evidence: 
 10 log!" ! !! !!!! !! !!! = 10 log!" ! !! !! !! ! +!"# !!!:! ! !   .                                                (6) 
 
This formulation offers the computation advantage that weights of evidence are also additive: 
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 !"# !!!:! ! = !"!! !!!:! ! ! +!"!! !!!:! ! !,!! …+!"!! !!!:! ! !,!!…!!!! !!,              (7) 
 
where we must remember to condition on Eprev as appropriate.  
 
4. Empirical Example: Evaluating Weights of Evidence 
Appendix A provides an explicit Bayesian analysis of a case study from Fairfield’s (2013,  
2015) research on tax policy change in Latin America. We compare Fairfield’s hypothesis 
against three rivals in light of six key observations from the case narrative. We assign priors 
drawing on our background information, evaluate likelihoods for each piece of evidence, and use 
Bayes’ rule to derive posterior probabilities.  We then conduct Bayesian sensitivity analysis to 
ascertain how much our conclusions depend on choices of priors and values of likelihood ratios.   
This section overviews our analysis of weights of evidence—the most important step in 
Bayesian inference—for two pieces of case evidence. Assessing weights of evidence, which 
involves ratios of likelihoods under alternative hypotheses, lets us ignore details that have a 
common effect on likelihoods irrespective of which hypothesis is true.  For instance, we might 
judge the amount of effort expended to obtain an interview with an informant or to gain access to 
an archive to be largely independent of which hypothesis is correct. Similarly, this approach 
minimizes effort required for conditioning on previous evidence when an argument can be made 
that dependence does not differ much across hypotheses. Working directly with ratios also helps 
leverage intuition—while we might reason that Ex makes us ten times (10 dB) more confident 
in H1 vs. H2, we may be less comfortable assigning value to each of the respective likelihoods.    
Fairfield’s case study examines a Chilean reform that revoked a regressive tax subsidy.  
She argues that an “equity appeal,” made during a presidential race in which inequality had 
assumed unusually high salience, compelled the right-wing opposition coalition to accept the 
reform in order to avoid electoral punishment. During the 2005 campaign, the right’s presidential 
candidate blamed Chile’s persistent inequality on the governing center-left coalition; the 
incumbent president responded by linking the tax subsidy to inequality and publicly challenging 
the opposition to support the reform. We denote this equity-appeal hypothesis as HEA. Below, we 
consider just two rival hypotheses: HI = The opposition accepted the reform because Chile’s 
institutionalized party system motivates cross-partisan cooperation and consensual politics, and 
HCC = The opposition accepted the reform because its core constituency—business and upper-
income individuals—had a weaker material interest in defending the tax subsidy in 2005 
compared to previous years, due to a decline in the assets eligible for the subsidy. We assume as 
part of our background information that HEA, HI, and HCC are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.   
 
E1 =Governing-coalition informants told the investigator that the center-left coalition discussed 
including a measure to eliminate the tax subsidy in multiple prior tax reforms, but that measure 
was ruled out as infeasible on every such occasion due to resistance from the right coalition.    
WOE1 (HEA : HI ) =  30 dB.  We judge E1 to be speaking clearly in favor of HEA relative to 
HI —we would be far more surprised to observe E1 in a world where HI is the correct hypothesis.  
In the world of HEA, the equity appeal altered the right’s behavior from resisting the reform in 
previous years to accepting the reform in 2005.  E1 is consistent with this scenario.  In contrast, if 
institutions produced consensus on eliminating the tax subsidy in 2005, they should also have 
done so in previous years, since our background information includes the fact that institutions 
did not change during the intervening period.  If eliminating the tax benefit had been discussed 
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and ruled out on only one occasion, we would be less surprised; however, E1 is a conjunction of 
multiple instances in which institutions failed to promote right-party cooperation. 
WOE1 (HEA : HCC ) = 3 dB.  While E1 is consistent with both HEA and HCC, we view the 
weight of evidence as weakly favoring HEA. In the world of HCC, the right accepted the reform in 
2005 because its core constituency no longer had sizable assets that benefitted from the tax 
subsidy, even though our background information (I) indicates that the right tended to resist even 
modest tax increases as a matter of principle.  To avoid a contradiction between HCC and I, we 
must assume that by 2005, the asset decline had pushed the right past its threshold of resolve for 
resisting the reform. However, under HCC and I, we have no clear prediction about when exactly 
we would expect the tax subsidy to be eliminated, whereas under HEA and I, we have a clear 
rationale for why the reform occurred in 2005 as opposed to some years earlier or later. Under 
HCC, the observed timeline is just one of several more or less equally plausible scenarios in 
which the successful reform occurs in a different year.  These multiple possibilities reduce the 
likelihood of the specific timeline observed.   
E1 illustrates the importance of comparing specific alternative hypotheses rather than 
attempting to evaluate the working hypothesis directly against its full logical negation.  Section 
3.1 emphasized that assessing likelihoods conditional on an ill-specified ~H may be essentially 
impossible.  For E1, the weights of evidence in favor of HEA relative to the two rivals are not 
equal.  If we try to directly evaluate WOE1 (HEA : ~HEA), how would we mentally inhabit a world 
as vague as ~HEA, which is really an amalgamation of two very different kinds of worlds?  Only 
after we have decomposed ~HEA into HI  and HCC can we reason meaningfully about weights of 
evidence by inhabiting each alternative world in turn.      
 
E2 = A finance ministry official told the investigator that the tax subsidy “was a pure transfer of 
resources to rich people...  It was not possible for the right [coalition] to oppose the reform after 
making that argument about inequality.”  Likewise, the former President told the investigator 
that the tax subsidy “never would have been eliminated if I had not taken [the opposition 
candidate] at his word” when the latter publicly professed concern over inequality. 
 We have aggregated two interview excerpts into a single piece of evidence, because they 
are strongly dependent under any hypothesis.  Regardless of which explanation is correct, we 
expect that the president and finance ministry officials have communicated extensively and share 
similar analyses of why the right accepted the reform.  Our aggregation decision also follows the 
rule of thumb from §3.2; we have similar information from similar sources.   
WOE2 (HEA : HI , E1 ) = WOE2 (HEA : HCC , E1 ) = 10 dB.  E2 provides glimpses of the 
causal mechanism underlying HEA by referring to the exchange between the opposition candidate 
and the president that culminated in the equity appeal. Because E2 makes the government appear 
savvy and effective at achieving socially-desirable goals while highlighting the opposition’s 
resistance to redistribution, we see little reason for the government to conceal this information if 
HEA is true. The likelihood P(E2 | HEA E1) should therefore be high. In an alternative world where 
either of the rival hypotheses is true, government informants might nevertheless have incentives 
to attribute the opposition’s support for the 2005 reform to the equity appeal, because this story 
portrays the government in a positive light and the opposition in a negative light. However, our 
background information gives us confidence in these informants’ knowledgeability, analytical 
judgments, and sincerity. Balancing these considerations, we judge E2 to favor HEA over each 
rival by 10 dB.   
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E2 illustrates that the accuracy of the information provided by the sources depends on the 
hypothesis (§3.3.2).  Under HEA, the informants’ statements must be taken as true, whereas under 
the rivals, the statements are necessarily false—the informants are either mistaken or lying.   
 
5. Improving Inference and Analytic Transparency 
In the context of efforts to establish process tracing as a rigorous methodology and growing 
attention to analytical transparency, several prominent scholars have argued that explicitly 
employing Bayesian analysis will make inferences more systematic and more amenable to 
scrutiny (Rohlfing 2013; Bennett 2015:297; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015).  We concur that 
explicit Bayesian analysis, if carefully implemented, offers several important advantages and 
opportunities for improving inference.  This approach forces us to clearly identify and carefully 
consider all salient evidence as well as critical elements of our background information.  It 
precludes subconsciously focusing on a favored working hypothesis by requiring us to consider 
states of the world characterized by rival hypotheses.  Explicit Bayesian analysis may also 
“eliminate the considerable ambiguity in many verbal phrases used to convey probabilities” 
(Bennett 2015:297); in particular, the decibel scale we advocate could help communicate our 
degrees of belief more effectively.  With practice, the guidelines elaborated in Section 3 may 
foster more systematic and more logically rigorous inferences compared to untrained intuition.    
However, explicit Bayesian analysis is clearly a “very tall order” (Humphreys and Jacobs 
2015:42), especially for evidence-intensive process tracing. As such, we must weight the 
advantages against the potential limitations and drawbacks (Table 2). We begin by discussing  
caveats based on our experience of elaborating Appendix A and then assess when explicit 
Bayesian process tracing will be more valuable or less valuable in light of the challenges.  
 
Table 2: Assessing the Potential of Explicit Bayesian Analysis 
 
Advantages and opportunities  Caveats and limitations  
• Ensures clear identification and careful 
assessment of salient evidence and key 
elements of the background information 
• Ensures consideration of alternative hypotheses 
• Facilitates more effective communication of 
degrees of belief  
• May help inferences approximate Bayesian 







• Probabilities cannot be unambiguously 
specified  
• Requires substantial training  
• Intractable beyond relatively simple causal 
models  
• May be unduly burdensome in practice 
• Explicit Bayesian analysis and transparency 
are not synonymous  
 
 
5.1 Caveats and Limitations 
The foremost challenge of explicit Bayesian process tracing entails assigning numerical 
values to all probabilities (priors and likelihoods).  In the natural sciences, a strong underlying 
theory and a description of the measurement apparatus (along with various simplifying 
assumptions) lead to a specific error model and thereby a likelihood function that unambiguously 
specifies probabilities for the various possible measurements that may be observed.  In the social 
sciences, there is no clear procedure for translating complex, narrative-based, non-reproducible, 
often qualitative information into precise probability statements. Efforts to explicitly apply 
Bayesian learning in qualitative social science will inevitably run up against the difficulty of 
quantifying likelihoods without precision or objectivity.  Specifying a range of probabilities 
rather than a precise value (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015) may be adequate for some purposes, 
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but ultimately, it simply relocates the arbitrariness of assigning numerical values.12  Even from a 
purely pragmatic perspective, this sort of approach has limited value, because propagating 
interval probabilities through Bayes’ rule is non-trivial when working with multiple hypotheses.  
While words used to express probability in common parlance are certainly ambiguous, 
quantification may simply disguise that ambiguity with false precision.   
A second caveat is that substantial training may be necessary before explicit Bayesian 
analysis can improve upon intuition. Our teaching experience thus far indicates that a day or two 
of intensive workshops is not adequate to successfully apply this approach. In fact, as part of the 
learning process, reasoning may get worse before getting better. While the metaphor of weighing 
evidence is in some ways intuitive, assessing the weight of evidence changes the way that we use  
our intuition.  Practice will be needed to master this fundamental aspect of Bayesian thinking.   
Third, explicit Bayesian analysis becomes intractable beyond fairly simple causal models, 
which are rarely adequate in social science. Recall that Bayesian analysis entails specifying 
mutually-exclusive hypotheses, which is nontrivial and may require over-simplification. Some of 
the hypotheses we assess against Fairfield’s (2013) explanation involve causal mechanisms 
that—in the real world—could potentially operate simultaneously or in interaction.  Assessing 
such possibilities requires elaborating a more complex but still mutually-exclusive hypothesis 
space, which would aggravate the challenges of assigning numerical values to likelihoods.  By 
contrast, in the natural sciences, Bayesian analysis is usually applied to very simple hypothesis 
spaces (even if the underlying theory and experiments are highly complex); for example: H1 = the 
Higgs boson mass is 124–126 GeV/c2, H2 = the mass is 126–128 GeV/c2, etc.    
Fourth, practical considerations may restrict the use of explicit Bayesian analysis. 
Appendix A, which includes various cross checks to ensure that likelihoods are sensible and 
reasonably consistent across the problem, exceeds the length of Fairfield’s (2013) article, which 
included three additional case studies; Fairfield’s (2015) book includes over 28 case studies.  
Assessing weights of evidence (likelihood ratios) instead of absolute likelihoods (Section 4) is a 
more feasible if somewhat less careful approach.  But either way, explicit Bayesian analysis 
cannot replace case narratives, which are an effective and efficient way to holistically 
communicate context, evidence, and analysis.  As such, requiring scholars to provide explicit 
Bayesian analysis for all of their cases, above and beyond their narrative work, would create 
heavy disincentives for process tracing. 
Finally, explicit Bayesian analysis should not be directly equated with transparency. On the 
one hand, this approach can obscure rather than clarify inference, especially if we disaggregate 
the evidence too finely and unpack our analysis into too many steps—we may become lost in 
minutiae. Moreover, making too many steps explicit may lull readers into uncritically accepting 
or glossing over the author’s reasoning, rather than assessing whether they can arrive at the 
conclusions through their own independent logical pathways, thereby undermining the scholarly 
scrutiny of inferences that analytical transparency is intended to promote. Even mathematicians 
routinely skip steps in published proofs; readers must fill in and verify themselves, which 
provides an important cross-check. On the other hand, transparency does not require assigning 
numerical values to probabilities and applying Bayes’ rule to derive an inference. Scholars can 
make the assumptions and logic behind their inferences explicit without resorting to numbers.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 To avoid subjective likelihood assignments, Humphreys and Jacobs (2015) include priors on the probative value 
of process-tracing clues; yet the problem then becomes how to translate background knowledge and theoretical 
expectations into an appropriate prior distribution.  Moreover, if we work within a single case, only averages over 
priors for clue probabilities matter, so their approach reduces to specifying likelihoods.   
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While these considerations do not necessarily constitute an argument against explicit Bayesian 
process tracing, they clarify that transparency is not necessarily an argument for adopting this 
approach.  
 
5.2 Applications  
Given the caveats, when might explicit Bayesian analysis prove most useful?  We begin 
with situations where we expect this approach to be of limited value and proceed toward those 
that proffer higher value.  If all observations strongly favor a particular hypothesis over the 
rivals, explicit Bayesian analysis is unlikely to improve on intuition.  Scholars can explain why 
the evidence is decisive without quantifying probabilities, and if the evidence is indeed 
compelling, readers should recognize it as such on its face.  Likewise, if the evidence has weak 
probative value, explicit Bayesian analysis may simply confirm the realization we would have 
obtained intuitively—the evidence is insufficient to strongly support any particular hypothesis 
(unless we already had strong priors or cannot think of reasonable alternatives).    
Moderate gains for inference may arise when the evidence is complex and does not clearly  
favor a single hypothesis. On the one hand, when some observations favor one hypothesis 
whereas others favor a rival, it may be difficult to intuitively ascertain which provides the best 
explanation. Explicit Bayesian analysis helps us keep track of nuances, consistently assess the 
weight of evidence for each observation, and systematically aggregate inferences across 
observations. On the other hand, there is a danger when evidence is ambivalent that conclusions 
derived via explicit Bayesian analysis may be driven by arbitrariness inherent in assigning 
numerical values to probabilities. Natural scientists would only believe that noisy data 
accumulates into a significant signal if the error model is well understood; in qualitative social 
science, analogous situations may rarely arise. Almost by definition, if the evidence pulls in 
different directions, small changes in probabilities may swing the inference in favor of one 
hypothesis or another.   
Nevertheless, explicit Bayesian process tracing in such cases may be merited for the sake 
of analytical transparency and informing future research.  Regarding transparency, if we must 
make inferential claims on the basis of ambivalent or weak evidence—if important questions are 
at stake13 and obtaining better evidence is infeasible—explicit Bayesian analysis can at least 
clarify the basis on which those claims rest and facilitate debate among scholars.  Looking 
forward to future data-gathering opportunities, explicit Bayesian analysis could also elucidate 
what kinds of additional evidence would be most useful for strengthening the inference.     
We envision a more valuable role for explicit Bayesian analysis in identifying the locus of 
contention when scholars disagree on inferences. As Hunter (1984:88) argues, through Bayesian 
analysis, “the sources of the disagreement can be determined much more easily than in normal 
verbal analysis.”  Explicit Bayesian analysis provides a clear framework for pinpointing 
disagreements: Do they arise from different background information and assumptions (e.g. a 
source’s motives or sincerity), different priors, or different assessments of likelihoods? If the 
problem lies with the probative value of evidence, which observations are most contested, and 
why? For these purposes, numbers serve primarily to stimulate discussion about inferential logic, 
assumptions, and judgments, and the ad-hoc component of quantification will be less 
problematic.  Our Bayesian sensitivity analysis in Appendix A illustrates how this clarification 
and adjudication process might work; we show that to remain unconvinced, a skeptical reader !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Hunter (1984) explores military applications. 
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would need to have extremely strong priors against the equity appeal explanation and/or contend 
that the evidence is far less discriminating than we have argued.      
We also foresee a valuable pedagogical role for explicit Bayesian analysis.  Reading 
examples and conducting exercises can train intuition to follow this inferential logic more 
systematically, thereby improving traditional narrative-based process tracing.  For example, one 
of the most salient lessons from our empirical case application is that the weight of evidence 
depends by definition on which hypotheses we compare; we cannot judge how decisive the 
evidence is with respect to our working hypothesis alone, without considering concrete 
alternatives.  Thinking in terms of the weight of evidence, even without assigning numbers, may 
help scholars identify their most discriminating observations.  More generally, many of our 
guidelines for explicit Bayesian analysis (summarized in Table 3) have direct analogs for more 
heuristic Bayesian reasoning in narrative-based process tracing—from comparing clearly-
specified mutually exclusive hypotheses and explaining why our background information 
suggests some explanations and justifies disregarding others from the outset, to considering how 
a source’s potential biases and instrumental incentives might change under rival hypotheses, and 
thinking about logical dependencies among the evidence when drawing inferences.  
Relatedly, elaborating an explicit Bayesian appendix for an illustrative case from one’s  
own research might help establish process-tracing “credentials.”  As much as we try to make our  
analysis transparent, multiple analytical steps will inevitably remain implicit.  Qualitative 
research draws on vast amounts of data, often accumulated over multiple years of fieldwork.  
There is simply too much evidence and too much background information that informs how 
evidence is evaluated to fully articulate or catalog.  Qualitative research is not replicable as per a 
controlled laboratory experiment; at some level, we must trust that scholars have made sound 
judgments. To that end, scholars might use an explicit Bayesian illustration to demonstrate their 
care in reasoning about the evidence and the inferences it permits.  
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Table 3: Guidelines for Explicit Bayesian Process Tracing 
 
Hypotheses and Priors Articulate clearly-specified, mutually exclusive hypotheses; do not attempt to directly 
compare H vs. ~H 
Choose an option for assigning prior probabilities: 
a)  Specify priors that aim to reflect background information as best as possible 
b) Assign equal priors following the “principle of indifference” 
c)  Conduct the analysis using multiple different prior distributions 
Evidence Treat information from distinct types of sources as separate pieces of evidence 
To facilitate reasoning, seek a middle ground between aggregating evidence into overly 
course-grained pieces and disaggregating into excessively fine-grained pieces 
Likelihoods 
P(E |Hx Eprev I ) 
Mentally “inhabit” the world of each hypothesis 
Assess the likelihood that “source S stated X”, considering that biases and instrumental 
incentives may change under rival hypotheses 
Condition likelihoods on all previously-incorporated pieces of evidence, thinking 
carefully about logical dependence  
Sequence the evidence as convenient to facilitate reasoning about logical dependence   
Identify key elements of the background information and explain how they inform 
likelihoods    
Simplify analysis by evaluating likelihood ratios and/or weight of evidence  
Logarithmic Scales Assign numerical values to probabilities on a logarithmic scale 
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